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(Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice
Anthony V. Alfieri*
INTRODUCTION

For several years, I have pursued a project devoted to the study of race,
lawyers, and ethics in the American criminal justice system. Building on the

evolving jurisprudence of Critical Race Theory,1 the project spans a series of
case studies investigating the rhetoric of race, or race-talk, in the prosecution

and defense of racially motivated violence. The first work of the series examines the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated
violence, highlighting the self-subordinating,racialized defense of Damian
Williams and Henry Watson on charges of beating Reginald Denny and others during the 1992 South Central Los Angeles riots.2 The next work inspects racial rhetoric in cases of white-on-black racially incited violence,
extrapolating other-subordinating, racialized defense strategies from the
criminal and civil trials of the United Klans of America and several Ku Klux
3
Klan members in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald in Mobile, Alabama.

A third work analyzes the discursive and symbolic meaning of race in double
trials involving successive state criminal and federal
tions, citing the trials of Lemrick Nelson and Charles
four days of interracial violence in the Crown Heights
New York in 199L.4 A forthcoming work explores

civil rights prosecuPrice arising out of
section of Brooklyn,
the federal criminal

* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Miami
School of Law. I am grateful to David Abraham, Adrian Barker, Jerome Culp, Wes Daniels, John
Ely, Michael Fischl, Clark Freshman, Bob Gordon, Ellen Grant, Patrick Gudridge, Amelia Hope,
Lisa Iglesias, Sharon Keller, Anne Klinefelter, Don Jones, David Luban, Deborah Rhode, Tom
Shaffer, Bill Simon, Jonathan Simon, Susan Stefan, Frank Valdes, Robin West, and David Wilkins
for their comments and support. I also wish to thank Jennifer McCloskey, Catherine Than, Shana
Stephens, and the University of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance.
This essay is dedicated to Aida Capodanno Nigro, great soul rising.
1. For collections of works in this area, see CRIICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) and CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
See also CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
2. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1301 (1995); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800 (1996).
3. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1063 (1997).
4. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials,76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998).
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prosecution of five white New York City police officers on charges of physically and sexually assaulting Abner Louima, a young Haitian immigrant, at a
Brooklyn station house in 1997. 5
The purpose of this ongoing project is to understand the meaning of racial identity, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law, lawyering, and ethics. To that end, the case studies serve as a means to develop
working hypotheses regarding the sociolegal experience of subordination:
specifically, the subordinating discourse and imagery of race trials, the nature of client and community harm caused by such subordination, the colorcoded partisanship of purportedly race-neutral ethics regimes that countenance such subordination, and the legitimacy of alternative race-conscious
ethical regulation. The process of reworking these hypotheses, one hopes,
will not only reveal the sociolegal structures of racial violence in American
history, but also reconstruct dominant visions of racial dignity and community in American law.
The reconstructive nature of this project derives in part from the teachings of Critical Race Theory and the emerging voices of color in AsianPacific6 and LatCrit scholarship.7 Unlike traditional canons of colorblind or
color-coded representation, the vision of practice underlying this growing
jurisprudential movement implies an ethic of good lawyering based on a
8
color-conscious, contextual approach to civil and criminal advocacy. Still
formative, the approach strives to accommodate the identity interests of client dignity and community integrity and, at the same time, to heed the injunction of effective representation. 9

5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace, 48 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming May 1999).
6. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:CriticalRace Theory,
Post-Structuralism,and NarrativeSpace, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1245-68 (1993) (urging the construction of an authentic, post-structuralist Asian American legal scholarship and announcing an
"Asian American moment'); cf. Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of
Backlash, 81 IoWA L. REV 1467, 1476-81 (1996) (citing the controversy over the emergence of an
"Asian American legal scholarship" as an example of a backlash against the gains of historically
disadvantaged groups).
7. See generallySymposium, LatCrit: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997);
Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of CriticalLegal Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997).
8. See Eric K. Yamamoto, CriticalRace Praxis: Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 873-95 (1997) (arguing for the use of
"critical race praxis," defined as combining "critical pragmatic socio-legal analysis with political
lawyering and community organizing for justice practice by and for racialized communities").
9. See GERALD P. LOPEz, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 11-82 (1992) (elucidating the rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination); Anthony V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1747, 1751 (1994) (reviewing L6PEZ, supra)(seeking a new method of lawyering for disadvantaged clients that empowers rather than disables client communities).

April 1999]

(ER)RACE-1NG AN ETHIC OF JUSTICE

The centrality of context to this approach lends added significance to the
celebrated publication of William Simon's The Practiceof Justice: A Theory
ofLawyers' Ethics. Together with the new wave quartet of Robert Gordon,10
David Luban," Deborah Rhode, 12 and David Wilkins, 13 Simon stands among
the preeminent scholars in legal ethics, singular in his deft integration of
critical theory into the study of the legal profession. Simon's trenchant critique of the profession and its jurisprudential underpinnings gives direction
to second wave projects like the one at hand. Indeed, The PracticeofJustice
provides a normative framework for designing race-conscious, communityregarding duties of legal representation. Instead of simply rehearsing
Simon's critique and casting objections against it, this essay endeavors to put
Simon's book to work in the service of fashioning an ethic of representation
inrace cases.
The essay is divided into four parts. Part I outlines Simon's jurisprudential critique and revision of liberal ethics regimes. Part II describes a postliberal vision of ethics tied to race-consciousness and racial community. Part
III contemplates the practicalities of institutionalizing a race-conscious,
community ethic of representation. Part IV parses and responds to theoretical objections to a race-conscious regulatory regime.
I. LIBERAL VISIONS: DOMINANT AND CONTEXTUAL

Like his new wave, post-realist compatriots, Simon treats law and the
animating force of legal consciousness as ideological artifacts produced by
normative contest and political conflict. He explores the ideology of the profession by interrogating its prevailing habits of mind, speech, and conduct.
His inquiry begins with the introduction of the Dominant View, 14 an ideological stance rooted in state bar codes, disciplinary doctrine, and professional responsibility literature. I5 Attributing both moral anxiety and ethical
disappointment to this Dominant View, Simon searches for an explanation of
popular and professional disenchantment with the social role and moral aspi10. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practiceas a Public Calling, 49 MD. L.
REV. 255 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
11. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM (1994).
12. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1995); DEBORAH
L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998).

13. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990);
David B. Wilkins, WJ~ho Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992).
14. See WILLIAM H. SlION, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 711 (1998). Hereinafter, all references to The Practice of Justicewill be made by citation to page
numbers without additional identification.
15. Seep. 7.
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ration of lawyers. 16 He locates this explanation in the norms of professional
responsibility that govern a lawyer's commitment to legality and justice.
17
The core of that commitment, according to Simon, is loyalty to the client.
Pointing to the structural tension between client interests and third-party or
public interests, Simon observes an anxious profession struggling with hard
moral decisions."8
Simon's observation of moral anxiety is widely shared. 19 Yet, for
Simon, the instant anxiety signals a greater deterioration in the "moral terrain
of lawyering." 20 He traces this anxiety to the jurisprudential foundation of
the Dominant View and its core principle of client loyalty.21 That categorical
imperative, Simon explains, carries crucial assumptions about the nature and
purpose of law and the legal system that extend beyond the Dominant View.
Here, the reach of jurisprudential logic extends through a common style of
decisionmaking that Simon calls categorical. Ethical judgment driven by
categorical injunction entails a style of decisionmaking that "severely restricts the range of considerations the decisionmaker may take into account
when she confronts a particular problem. '22 Under this style, Simon notes,
"a rigid rule dictates a particular response in the presence of a small number
of factors. 2 3 Hence, he adds, the "decisionmaker has no discretion to consider factors that are not specified or to evaluate specified factors in ways
other than those prescribed by the rule."2 4 Both the American Bar Association's Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibilit 5 and its Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct,26 Simon concludes, "legitimate the lawyer in pursuing
' 7
any arguably lawful goal of the client through any arguably lawful means. 2

16. See pp. 1-7.
17. See p. 7 ("The core principle of the Dominant View is this: the lawyer must-or at least
may-pursue any goal of the client through any arguably legal course of action and assert any nonfrivolous legal claim.").
18. See pp. 4-7.
19. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE

LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 33-39 (1994) (describing changes in
the practice of law that tempt lawyers into unethical conduct); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST
LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (1993) (declaring a transformative "crisis

in the American legal profession").
20. See p. 4.
21. Under the Dominant View, Simon comments, "the only ethical duty distinctive to the
lawyer's role is loyalty to the client. Legal ethics impose no responsibilities to third parties or the
public different from that of the minimal compliance with law that is required of everyone." P. 8.
22. P. 9.
23. P. 9.
24. P. 9.
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1980).

26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1998).
27. P. 8.
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Even competing visions of practice, Simon laments, suffer from the infirmities of this categorical style ofjudgment. 28 The altruistic Public Interest
View, for example, adheres to the basic maxim "that law should be applied
in accordance with its purposes, and litigation should be conducted so as to
promote informed resolution on the substantive merits."29 More conventional perspectives on ethics and professional responsibility suffer in the
same way. To Simon, for instance, a rule-focused approach emphasizing
mechanical, positive law compliance quickly degenerates into the folly of
moribund formalism. 30 A role-morality perspective underscoring nonlegal
value commitments and personal moral autonomy, by comparison, strains the
bounds of professional role and legal obligation to an untenable degree. 31 A
contrasting personal-relations approach stressing the friendship-based extralegal values of loyalty, trust, and empathy unwittingly denigrates norms of
legal merit and justice. 32 Last, a prudential approach heralding the "lawyerstatesman" ideal of practical reason derived from common law modes of de33
cisionmaking badly underestimates the moral quality of practice.
Overcoming the reigning preference for categorical styles of judgment,
Simon advances a contextual approach to ethical decisionmaking that urges
vindication of the underlying legal merits of a matter. 34 For Simon, this approach involves "a judgment that applies relatively abstract norms to a broad
range of the particulars of the case at hand." 35 His Contextual View imagines a legal ethics regime contingent on a lawyer's discretionary judgment
exercised in a manner likely to promote justice. On this view, the promotion
of justice is neither inconsistent with the rational, vigorous pursuit of a client's private goals nor inconsonant with the procedural and adversarial public norms of the legal system. Both private and public values, Simon contends, may be served in the particularized circumstances of a case to uphold
36
the aspirational tradition of legal professionalism.
Jurisprudentially, then, Simon steers a delicate course. He seeks to
maintain a sense of fidelity to law and to the norms of liberal legalism while
he struggles to temper the radical excesses of possessive individualism
through discretionary appeal to a greater ideal of public justice. Unfortunately, even a scholar of Simon's elegance and skill must fail in such an en28. See pp. 8-9.
29. P. 8 (emphasis added).
30. See pp. 14-15.
31. Seepp. 15-1S.
32. See pp. 19-21.
33. Seepp. 21-25.
34. Seepp. 9-11.
35. P. 10.
36. See pp. 9-11.
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terprise. The weight of liberal foundational norms-moral agency, radical
individualism, contractarian commodity exchange, and public-private separation-condemns the project of ideological reparation. Consider, for example, Simon's overbroad concept of client agency. Construed either as an
isolated individual or as a corporate entity, Simon's client often seems to
possess an unchecked free will, a power of agency unfettered by material
constraints in counseling or in the political economy. 37 Consider as well his
crabbed notion of the "public dimension" of client-group loyalty and clientcommunity nexus outside the legal system. 38 Narrowly defined, client loyalty operates to exclude the competing values of family, group, and community. Simon confesses as much but offers little guidance in the effort to reintegrate those values into a richer conception of other-regardingloyalty
relevant to the support of "third-party and public interests." 39 More troubling, his underdeveloped notion of a larger, public community reinstates the
private alienation of liberal individualism. Equally frustrating, the vitality of
liberal legalism enjoys reinvigoration under his prescription of discretionary
judgment. Because the prescribed act of discretion is itself ungrounded in
community or some other public-regarding principle, Simon's lawyer may
simply reenact his own private moral preference at the expense of a clientcommunity participatory resolution. The next Part ponders whether a raceinformed, post-liberal vision of ethical lawyering might fare any better.
II. POST-LIBERAL VISIONS: RACE-CONSCIOUSNESS AND RACIAL
COMMUNITY

Critical Race Theory offers a battery of post-liberal visions embracing
race-consciousness and racial community. Both liberal and postmodem in
nature, the visions offer conflicting interpretations of racial identity, racialized
narrative, and race-neutral representation. Several contemporary trials illustrate
this conflict and the interpretive violence that binds racial discourse and symbol
together in the harmful experience of client and community subordination.
Consider, for example, the recent trials of Damian Williams and Henry Watson, the Alabama-based United Kans of America, and Lemrick Nelson and
Charles Price. Careful scrutiny of these trials shows racial identity to be
mutable in character, racialized narrative to be unstable in form, and raceneutral advocacy to be color-coded in content. The shifting circumstances of
procedural and substantive laws, judges and juries, parties, victims, attor37. See pp. 5-7 (describing representation of Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings & Loan);
pp. 166-69 (same); pp. 151-56 (discussing representation of a private university in a collective bargaining union dispute).
38. See pp. 11, 149-56.
39. P. 225 n.32; see also p. 211.
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neys, and sociolegal culture add to this variability, creating cross-cutting
lines of racial demarcation within law and the legal system. Surprisingly,
what emerges out of this racial vortex is a relatively fixed set of status
boundaries implying a system of moral hierarchy. The upshot is seen in the
spectacle of the American race trial where identity, narrative, and representation shift in an ongoing contest of accommodation and resistance to wellentrenched racial hierarchy.
Racial identity is deeply embroiled in the moral hierarchy of the AmeNcan race trial. It is expressed in lawyer speech and conduct, in the discourses
of constitutionalism, in legislation, and in the common law. 40 The colors of
black and white, in fact the categories of blackness and whiteness, dominate
those discourses, naturalizing color-coded inferences and color-conscious
stereotypes about racial identity. The heart of both inference and stereotype
is race-infected moral inferiority.
The precept of inferiority is rhetorically encoded in the racialized defense. Color-coded claims that overtly or covertly appeal to demeaning racial stereotypes shape the form and substance of the racialized defense. Pervasive in American law, culture, and society, the claims disclose the historical linkage connecting the past defense of antebellum slave rebellion4 1 and
the contemporary defense of deprivation-fueled insurrectionist violence. 42
The strength of that link hinges on moral character.
The prevalence of racial identity judgments of moral inferiority in criminal lawyer narrative and storytelling follows in part from the basic presuppositions of traditional criminal defense advocacy (partisanship and moral nonaccountability) 43 and in part from the liberal premise of freely exerted client
40. On racial identity and lawyer conduct, see Robin Charlow, Tolerating Deception andDiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9 (1997). On racial identity and the discourses ofconstitutionalism, see Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
ConstitutionalLaw ofImmigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998). On racial identity and legislation,

see Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, andDomestic Race Relations: A "'MagicMirror" into the HeartofDarkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111 (1998). On racial identity and post-common law
codes, see Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of RacialDetermination in the NineteenthCentury South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998).

41. See Ariela Gross, Pandora's Box: Slave Characteron Trial in the Antebellum Deep
South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267, 288-91 (1995) (describing how antebellum southern courts
accepted characterizations of slave runaways not as people who had chosen to flee, but as property
with an inherent defective quality).
42. See Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based Upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV.

731, 738-41, 748-57 (1996) (describing cases where defendants attempted to use the ills of their
inner-city environment or the effects of racism as excuses for criminal behavior).
43. See Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 17-21 (1994) (finding that principles of partisanship and nonaccountability free advocates from legal, professional, and moral responsibility for the means and ends of representation when pursued within legal constraints).
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subjectivity. On these bases, racialized narratives appear contingent on instrumental lawyer strategy and voluntary client self-construction. Although
contingent, advocacy narratives in race cases sound determinate themes of a
natural or a necessary racial order. These themes resonate in historical
proclamations of a naturally defective black moral character and courtroom
declarations of the necessary portrayal of a deprivation-induced black moral
deficiency. Clothing strategic argument in the natural and necessitarian
rhetoric of racial inferiority legitimates subordinating constructions of moral
character and conduct under a claim of race-neutral representation. The
stance of race-neutrality cloaks the color-coded practice of advocacy.
Consider the rhetoric of race in cases of black-on-white racially motivated private violence, specifically in the assault and attempted murder trial
of Damian Williams and Henry Watson. 44 To win acquittals, the WilliamsWatson defense attorneys challenged and ultimately refuted substantial evidence of intent and voluntary conduct available to prove criminal liability for
attempted murder and aggravated mayhem in the beating of Reginald Denny
and others. Their main defense rested on a "group contagion" theory of
mob-incited diminished capacity. Marshaled as a partially exculpatory defense, the theory holds that young black males as a group, and the black
community as a whole, share a pathological tendency to commit acts of violence in collective situations. Both Williams and Watson are young, male,
and black. Among the victims, Denny is white, and the others are of mixed
ethnic and racial backgrounds.
The rhetorical structure of criminal defense stories of black-on-white racial violence embedded in the Williams-Watson trial record reflects the
sometimes dissonant incorporation of competing narratives of deviance and
defiance. The narratives construct the identity of young black males in terms
of both bestial pathology and insurrectionist rage. That dissonance produces
racialized narratives of "good" and "bad" young black men, thus reducing
racial identity to a dichotomy of virtue and sin. Under this dichotomy,
blackness itself resembles an act of original sin fatal to moral character.
Distilling male racial identity into objective, universal categories of unalterable human nature distorts the meaning of racial identity and the image of
racial community. The tendency of white and black criminal defense lawyers to privilege deviance narratives and to subordinate defiance narratives in
storytelling magnifies that distortion, inscribing the mark of bestial pathology into the sociolegal texture of racial identity and community.
Next consider racial rhetoric in the context of white-on-black private
violence, particularly in the 1981 lynching of Michael Donald by the Ku
44. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1308-20.
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Klux Klan.45 The legal defense of lynching displayed in the Alabama Klan
trials 46 demonstrates the identity-making function of legal narrative in the
context of race and community bias.47 Specifically, the defense captured a
white community-minded imagination infusing the most ordinary individuals
with racial invective and hatred. Several lynching defenses-jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity-embody a distinct narrative form of the racialized defense. Both the defense of jury nullification and
that of victim denigration erect moral hierarchy by overt use of racialized
narrative. Nullification rhetoric trumpets white racial supremacy. Denigration rhetoric intones black racial inferiority. The defense of diminished capacity, by contrast, reproduces hierarchy by covert reference to the normative value of segregated community.
The moral hierarchies implanted in the racialized narratives accompanying the lynching defenses of nullification, denigration, and diminished capacity denote difference in sociolegal status. The defense of jury nullification, for example, invokes community commitment to racial difference and
subordination. Propounded as an expression of community moral sentiment,
nullification seeks to rectify or to reinforce perceived inequalities of racial
status. For the white defender of black lynching, the criminal jury trial provides a forum for citizen political participation aimed at curing the problem
of white disenfranchisement.
The racialized defense of victim denigration rests on the obfuscation of
racial identity behind the image of deviance. Criminal defense lawyers employ deviant imagery in elevating the status of the white lawbreaker and degrading the worth of the black victim. The denigration defense centers on
the racially subordinate status of black victims. Renewing this status bolsters
claims of black moral, physical, and mental inferiority, thereby providing the
moral rationale for lynching and segregation.
The racialized defense of diminished capacity combines commitment,
community, and delusion to free white lawbreakers of moral and criminal
culpability. Proponents of the defense contend that the extreme nature of
white commitment to broad racial supremacy induces a delusional state of
mind. Caught up in the emotion of populist resistance to arguably unlawful
state mandates (desegregation and affirmative action), white lawbreakers
engage in acts of racial violence without individual or collective remorse.

45. See Alfieri, supranote 3, at 1063-65.
46. Both federal and state criminal trials ended in convictions with sentences ranging from
life imprisonment to death. A subsequent federal civil rights trial concluded in a $7 million award of
damages against the Alabama Klan. See id.
47. See generally Lou FALKNER WILLIAMS, THE GREAT SOUTH CAROLINA Ku KLUX KLAN
TRLUS, 1871-1872 (1996).
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Overcoming the image of white savagery, the defense offers the sympathetic
impression of white innocence and empowerment.
Consider as well the racialized defense of Lemrick Nelson and Charles
Price in the 1991 murder of Yankel Rosenbaum. 48 A bundle of racialized
narratives attend the Nelson-Price state and federal trials, infecting both
prosecutorial and defense tactics. The dueling narratives generate racecontaminated opening statements, witness examinations, and closing arguments replete with claims of white hierarchical bias allegedly manifested in
the acts of police officers and prosecutors, and widespread assertions of
black deviant pathology demonstrated in family disfunction, juvenile delinquency, and drug abuse. Moreover, the narratives spawn pretrial motion
strategies, such as recusal and adult transfer, that hinge on the contention of
the defective, indeed irredeemable, state of white and black moral character.
Apparently, for blacks at least, this original defect seals the criminal fate of
both adults and children.
Dominant ethics rules tolerate the above color-coded criminal defense
strategies under neutral accounts of liberal theory. Two principal accounts
stand out in this respect, circulating through the great bulk of ethics rules.
The first, loosely based on the contractarian strand of liberalism, draws on
the familiar presuppositions of moral agency, radical individualism, commodity exchange, and public-private separation. In this code-ratified account, the client reaches independent moral decisions concerning the private
objectives, and even the means, of representation. 49 Formulated under market conditions, the decision seeks to maximize client commodity value in
economic exchange relationships, including welfare state interchanges. In
this way, the contractarian account treats deviance-specific racialized strategies as the rational and voluntary decision of an autonomous client.
A second account, founded on an enlarged communitarian strand of liberalism, relies on the understated deliberative and third-party elements
woven into the often overlooked texture of liberal theory. In this similarly
rule-sanctioned account, the client approves deviance-enhanced strategies
that result from lawyer-client colorblind deliberative counseling.5 0 Deliberation, of course, may be inclusive or exclusive of the public at large. Publicinclusive deliberation ensures some recognition and accommodation of thirdparty individuals or groups. Conversely, public-exclusive deliberation affords little cognizance of or solicitude toward third-party interests. In this
48. See Alfieri, supra note 4, at 1323-25, 1335-39.
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1998) (requiring lawyer to

abide by client's decisions on certain topics).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1998) (directing lawyer to ren-

der advice to client based on professional judgment).
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sense, advisory-directed forms of lawyer-client deliberation in no way guarantee an outcome favorable to third-party or public interests. Codeencouraged dialogue may be confined simply to economic and political deliberative factors without mention of higher moral or wider social considerations.
The Model Rules and the Model Code countenance the deformity of client and community racial identity constructions by allowing color-coded,
racial deviance-based criminal defense strategies to survive unregulated on
the presumption that a client may freely adopt a self-subordinating narrative
as a function of either independent moral decisionmaking or lawyer counseling. Ethical legitimacy in this context rests in part on the rhetoric of colorblindness and in part on the belief that the discourse of the public sphere of
law and society is somehow separate from the self-conscious identity-making
imaginings of the private sphere of family and community. To the extent
that ethics rules reinforce racial status boundaries in law and society, reformers must treat advocacy narratives as a kind of status-preserving discourse
fostered by laws, legal agents, and legal institutions. Effective code reform,
therefore, must be undertaken against the practical backdrop of laws, legal
institutions, and the sociolegal relations of lawyers, clients, and legal administrators and adjudicators. The next Part reviews the practical considerations
that Simon encounters in mounting institutional reform strategies and that,
moreover, are likely to be encountered in the reformist effort to institutionalize a race-conscious, community ethic of representation.

m.

INSTITUTIONALIZING RACIAL ETHICS

Fulfilling the task of institutionalizing a race-conscious, community ethic
of representation depends on twin stances toward the descriptive structure and
prescriptive resolution of legal ethics problems. Descriptively, Simon points
out, the structure of legal ethics problems is permeated by recurring analytic
tensions distinguishing substance from procedure, purpose from form, and
broad from narrow framing.51 Prescriptively, he adds, the resolution of ethics problems demands contextual judgment. Without a normative compass,
he admits, this style of discretionary judgment falters. To steer lawyer
judgment, Simon engrafts the normative maxims of justice and legal merit
onto traditional codes of legal ethics.5 2 Summoned to promote justice, the
maxims purportedly guide resolution of the key tension in lawyer obligation

51. Seepp. 139-56.
52. See pp. 21, 50-51, 138-39, 158-60, 195. Simon asserts that the lawyer enjoys "access to
principles of legal merit and justice through both his membership in the society and his training as a
lawyer." P. 51.
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confronted when "the interests of clients conflict with those of third parties
'53
or the public.
For Simon, the intractable problems of competing obligation in legal
ethics translate into heavy burdens of contextual judgment. The basic structure of legal ethics problems, however, militates against the particularized
application of such discretionary judgment. Dominant ethics rules, according to Simon, afford neither a substantive yardstick for evaluating legal merit
nor an established set of procedures for conducting that evaluation.5 4 The
absence of a merit-based substantive benchmark and a procedural matrix
thwarts discretionary judgment. The schism dividing purposive and formal
methodologies additionally confounds lawyer judgment.5 5 The tendency to
rely on alternately broad and narrow issue-framing methods further undermines the exercise of lawyer discretionary judgment.5 6
To escape the rigid confines of substantivist and positivist categories
and, thus, to avert quarrels over substance/procedure, purpose/form, and
broad/narrow framing in ethical problem-solving, Simon forgoes categorical
analysis and the corresponding facile resolution of jurisprudential tensions in
favor of renewed contextual discretion in the framing of ethics problems.5 7
For Simon, the contextual development of a legal method combining substantive purpose, pragmatism, particularized fact, lawyer skill, and institutional expertise relegitimates the exercise of lawyer discretionary judgment.
Under Simon's Contextual View, discretion of this sort employs general
standards of relevance that identify considerations tending to give interpretive logic to applicable substantive law, to lend substantial practical weight
to a particular outcome, and to harness lawyer knowledge and institutional
competence appropriately.5 8
Initial resistance to the institutionalization of the Contextual View of reform comes from many practical fronts.5 9 Surveying the field of protest,
Simon starts with the claim of contextual inefficiency concerning both the
time and effort devoted to ethical decisionmaking. When situated within
conventional practice settings, this claim gives rise to the related charge of
ineffectuality and, more disturbing, to the assertion of the threatened unrepresentation of "unpopular clients" due to discretionary judgments of substan-

53. P. 138.
54. See pp. 138-42.
55. See pp. 144-46.

56.
57.
58.
59.

See pp. 149-51.
See pp. 7-11.
See pp. 150-51.
See pp. 156-57.

April 1999]

(ER)RACE-JNG AN ETHIC OFJUSTICE

tive merit and to the independent freedoms obtained by principled commitment to legal values.6 0
Simon denies the practical and moral costs of the Contextual View.
Situating that posture within the "aspirational tradition of professional rhetoric," he insists that "the Contextual View can serve as a basis for guiding and
appraising lawyers' exercise of their discretion," even without serious institutional change. 61 Steadfast in this contention, he finds the Contextual View
easily susceptible to institutionalization, relying on an enforcement structure
of contextual norms and voluntary rule commitments supervised by bar associations or, alternatively, by courts, legislatures, and public regulatory agencies. 62 To demonstrate the viability of a conventional disciplinary regime
governed by contextual norms, Simon analogizes to the common law tort
liability system. The tort system, he argues, illustrates the workings of a disciplinary system of professional responsibility capable of enunciating stan63
dards of professional conduct and enforcing substantive norms.
To his credit, Simon admits that the tort model analogy fails to exhaust
the practical considerations of institutional ethics reform. Stymied in the
effort to restructure the market for legal services concordant with the promotion of a "high commitment lawyering" ethic, 64 Simon concedes the importance of addressing the practical considerations of psychological bias, transaction and education costs, enforcement and information costs, and rulemaking procedures. 65 Yet, even with such practical engagement, Simon's
Contextual View struggles to overcome the emotional and cognitive bias
constraining ethical commitment and the scarcity of voluntary enforcement
activity or commitment-forcing rules sufficient to sanction noncomplying
behavior such as strategic nondisclosure.6 6 Frustrated, Simon advances the
notion of publicly subsidized optional codes operating to underwrite the
"production of alternative high-commitment bodies of norms that parties
67
could adopt by incorporation."
In this light, consider the remedial regulation of criminal defense advocacy
under an alternative, perhaps optional, race-conscious, community ethic of professional responsibility. Contemporary ethics codes dictating the conventions
of racialized defense practices that have come to mark race trials permit lawyers
to maintain a colorblind stance of nonaccountability in appraising the moral
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See pp. 156-62.
P. 195.
See pp. 195-97.
See pp. 197-203.
See pp. 203-06.
Seepp. 206-10.
See pp. 203-14.
P. 212.
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consequences of self-subordinating racial essentialism and in assaying the harm
done to the client-self as well as to third-party and public interests. By contrast,
a race-conscious community ethic establishes the principle of lawyer moral accountability for racialharm that disfigures the character of individual clients
and tarnishes the integrity of third parties or communities. Like Simon's Contextual View, the instant ethic merges precepts controverted by, but well known
to, liberal regimes. The opening precept, race-consciousness, posits race and
racial difference as fundamental to a client's identity and to her moral decisionmaking process. An additional precept, contingency, asserts that a client's
moral character and identity originate and unfold in contexts linked to but located outside the self, such as the places of family, school, or community. A
final precept, collectivity, postulates lawyers and clients as full, collaborative
partners in devising strategies of representation that work to prevent harm to the
dignitary and community interests of the client-self as well as those of third
parties.
In prior studies, two rule-based approaches offered the promise of integrating this bundle of alternative precepts into a feasible ethic. 68 A strong
version of the ethic requires criminal defense lawyers, acting unilaterally, to
abandon the use of deviance-based racialized strategies, except to nullify a
racially discriminatory prosecution. 69 Not unlike Simon's Contextual View,
this lawyer-driven approach borrows from long-standing traditions of lawyer
independence and moral activism. A weak version directs lawyer-client
counseling dialogue about the composition of racial identity and its connection to race-influenced community. This bilateral approach reignites the
Brandeisian vision of social responsibility echoed, albeit weakly, in Simon's
Public Interest View. 70 In addition to rendering joint assessments of moral
character and community integrity, this type of dialogue tests deviance narratives against the norms of client authenticity, dignity, and self-respect,
weighing the risk of harm to personhood and to community.
Doubtless, some may denounce these remedial prescriptions, finding
both unilateral and bilateral approaches to pass gravely wide of constitutional
and ethical markers. 7' Like the self-regulating legislation recently promul68. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supra note 2, at 1340-42.
69. Reasons of efficacy recommend that the nullification proviso follow well-established procedures governing the allocation of evidentiary burdens common to cases of discriminatory employment and jury selection.
70. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: ReconsideringBrandeis as People's Lawyer, 105
YALE L.J. 1445, 1471 (1996) (discussing Brandeis' role in shaping the concept of the public interest
lawyer).
71. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discovering the
Road Less Traveled, 96 COLuM. L. REv.788, 789-93 (1996) (arguing that Professor Alfieri's two
approaches are "disconnected from any concrete goal or objective that a rulemaking body could
effectively monitor or control" and are "on a collision course with principles underlying the First
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gated by the judiciary, 72 the instant approaches make serious commitments to
norms and methods incompatible with dominant ethics rules. Both approaches, for example, interweave social and legal strands of race-talk, pronounce harm to identity-based dignitary and community interests, and significantly curtail the criminal defense lawyer's duty to advocate on behalf of
individual client interests. At bottom, these commitments flow from an antisubordination politics of law dedicated to overturning racial hierarchies of
white/black narrative and social/legal discourse. On this theory of politics, the
well-settled duty of client loyalty that survives under the aegis of race-neutral
partisanship and moral nonaccountability gives way to moral claims of identity
and community. To be sure, normative deference nowhere indicates the abdication of professional role or the wholesale repudiation of ethical duty. Moreover, nothing here compels the unalloyed political defense of racially motivated
acts of violence on the grounds of self-defense, symbolic speech, or revolutionary fervor. The proposed ethic of race-conscious community representation
merely seeks to reopen the traditionally suppressed lawyering premises of liberal legalism incorporated in the enlarged notions of lawyer duty and client or
third-party injury.
Progress in reopening these foundational notions is already at hand. This
progress is evidenced by categorical instability affecting the lawyer's duty to
furnish nonlegal advice on matters germane to moral character 73 and community interest. 74 Despite this core instability, the Dominant View prevails,
conflating the duty of racialized defense and the best interest of the client.
Yet coherent application of the best interest axiom requires a steady account
of client identity, the discernment of client values and interests, and a normative predicate to override client preference. The Dominant View meets
none of these requirements. It lacks a meaningful account of client identity.
It provides no strategy of discernment. And it leaves normative preferences
unstated.
Nevertheless, the alternative ethic of race-conscious responsibility will not
soon unseat the Dominant View. This is unfortunate, given that the alternative
Amendment" and the Sixth Amendment); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030, 1069
n.183 (1995) (asserting that Professor Alfieri's approaches, if codified, would be "exceedingly
vague').
72. Judicial legislation expressly regulates certain practices of racial advocacy. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5)-(6) (1997).
73. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counselingat the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Laiyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1563-64 & n.38 (1995) (noting ambiguity in
form, content, and direction of "moral dialogue").
74. See Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty To
Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REv. 901, 922-54 (1995) (revising adversary ethic to
integrate duty of racial harmony especially in the context of community lawyers).

STANFORD LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 51:935

ethic will neither unfairly divest clients and communities of color of participatory control or influence over their racial identity, nor reinscribe elements of
universalism and objectivity in demeaning advocacy narratives of race. Instead,
the ethic pursues the postmodern campaign inaugurated by Critical Race Theory, a political campaign struggling paradoxically to define racial identity as
subjective and pluralist while, at the same time, to decenter the racial subject as
a free-wheeling moral agent unencumbered by attachments to family or community. Criminal defense advocates who continue to construe racial identity in
monolithic, rather than multifaceted, terms and to strip clients from, rather than
link clients to, community contexts, run the risk of reenacting a grotesque history of essentialism and stigma in American law.7 5 In addition, they risk instigating a revival of the metaphysics of liberal individualism in law and lawyering: moral agency, radical individualism, contractarian commodity exchange,
and public-private separation.
The liberal metaphysics undermining Simon's jurisprudential venture in
ethical revision likewise hinder the development of a theory of the racialized
subject and racial pluralism in advocacy. Moreover, they impede the complementary formulation of a theory of the community-enmeshed racial subject. For this subject, the experience of harm may cross from the singular to
the plural, overlapping the planes of self and community. 76 The metaphysics
of moral agency, radical individualism, contractarian commodity exchange,
and public-private separation inhibit the reimagination of the racialized subject beyond the categorical myopia of deviance and defiance. Furthermore,
they limit the possibility of transformative self-construction shaped by a
sense of multiple or community consciousness. Thus limited, the proposed
ethic of race-conscious, community representation may run afoul of its own
goal: to expose the sociolegal structures of racial violence in American history and to reconstruct dominant visions of racial dignity and community in
American law. Standing alone, that goal may not withstand theoretical onslaught. The next Part parses theoretical objections to a race-conscious
regulatory regime.
IV. OBJECTIONS: LIBERAL AND POST-LIBERAL
Liberal and post-liberal objections to a race-conscious, community ethic
of representation take numerous forms. Consider six such objections pressed
from a theoretical standpoint. Culled mainly from Simon's own mounted
75. See Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why the
First Amendment Is No Bar to ChallengingRacism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal Profession, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 781, 789-90, 821-23 (1996) (tracking injuries spawned by racial and
ethnic bias and discrimination against lawyer and litigant communities).
76. See pp. 195-215.
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defense, these include the claim of alienation and self-betrayal, 77 the asserted
right to racial injustice, 78 the contention of long-run racial justice, 79 the attenuated obligation of obedience to law,80 the averred duty of aggressive
criminal defense, 81 and the reformist distrust gleaned from Critical Race
Theory.
The first objection goes to the claim of professional alienation and selfbetrayal. For those wedded to the Dominant View, the introduction of a
race-conscious ethic may be dispiriting, alienating the lawyer from her traditional understanding of colorblind professionalism. Estrangement may also
stem from a sense of ineffectuality and the loss of role morality. When coupled with the fear of declining self-governance and deteriorating legal judgment, the notion of professional redemption through meaningful work becomes lost, replaced by ambivalence and moral anxiety.8 2 Yet the Dominant
View itself manufactures the same kind of ambivalence and moral anxiety in
the ratification of colorblind professionalism and race-neutral ethics. Approval of this sort may prove similarly dispiriting, resulting in alienation
from the law, the client, the courts, and the professional guild. Estrangement
of this order may in turn fatally undermine the search for grace and redemption in the work of representation on behalf of the other and in pursuit of
civic community.
A second objection rests on the asserted right to racial injustice. The
Dominant View establishes a client's entitlement to racial injustice. Basic to
Libertarianism and Positivism, this right derives from principles of client
liberty and bounded legal norms. Announced in the maxim of "zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law,"8" the right counts injustice as vital to
client liberty and, therefore, as autonomy enhancing. Similarly, the right
construes injustice as equality enhancing, at least when legal rules otherwise
secure equal protection and evenhanded application within the adversarial
84
system.
Abundant flaws diminish the injustice entitlement argument. Simon
mentions, for example, the overlooked presence of nonlegal norms and the
corresponding problems of legal and nonlegal norm interpretation and enforcement.8" He also points to the unduly narrow sense of lawyer obligation
77. See pp. 109-37.

78. See pp. 26-52.
79. See pp. 53-76.
80. Seepp. 77-108.
81. See pp. 170-94.
82. See pp. 109-37.
83. P. 28.
84. See pp. 26-52.
85. See pp. 30-43.
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and the barren notion of client autonomy undergirding the right to racial injustice.8 6 Discovering a moral and political basis for stopping short of the
"bounds of the law" in cardinal democratic values, Simon urges a revived
commitment to the norms of legal merit and justice chiefly accessible
87
through lawyer citizenship and training.
A third objection pertains to the contention of long-run racial justice.
Simon elicits this contention from defenders of the Dominant View style of
advocacy. Maintaining that short-run incidents of racial injustice in fact
"avoid greater injustices" and promote a "higher level of justice in the aggregate and [in] the long run," 8 these advocates tolerate substantial levels of
injustice. In search of cogent rationales, they rely upon powerful psychological commitments to client adversarial claims, notwithstanding the system-wide costs of overweening client identification and partisanship exemplified in the strong version of confidentiality championed by the Dominant
View. 9 Still, the implication of the lawyer in racial injustice, even in the
short run, proves disconcerting here. For Simon, such events of adversarial
corruption "underestimate the possibilities of decentralized judgments about
justice
and overestimate the possibilities of technocratic social engineer90
ing."
A fourth objection concerns the attenuated duty of obedience to law condoned by the Dominant View. Simple espousal of a categorical duty of obedience to law fails to cure the error of underinclusive defimition. Under the
Dominant View, law and legal obligation receive inadequate substantive
treatment. This insufficiency, Simon observes, curbs the potentially broad
ambit of respect for law, allowing advocates directly and indirectly to encourage or to facilitate illegality. 91 The racialized defenses of lynching-jury
nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity-provide a case in
point. Sprouting from a weak substantive commitment to law-induced obedience, lynching defenses privilege legal norms of client loyalty, confidentiality, and zealous advocacy, as well as nonlegal norms of a white supremacist
social order. In the same way, the defenses subordinate legal and nonlegal
norms of racial fairness and democratic citizenship. The hierarchical ordering of legal and nonlegal norms in accordance with some perverse historical
measure of racial superiority or inferiority documents the profound danger of
86. See pp. 43-44.
87. See pp. 26-52. Simon states: "[T]here is surely a substantial class of situations within
which lawyers are relatively well positioned to make decisions that contribute to the vindication of
merit." P. 52.

88.
89.
90.
91.

P.53.
See pp. 53-76.
P.76.
Seep. 77.
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legal/nonlegal normative dichotomy. Realizing this danger, Simon rejects a
rigid, positivist notion of legality that denies authority to nonlegal norms as
an inadequate basis for a general lawyer's ethic. 92 That notion is similarly
incompatible with an ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
A fifth objection arises from the averred duty of aggressive criminal defense. Like many,93 Simon admits that the practice of criminal defense entails different institutional considerations and impinges on different client
interests. 94 In spite of this customary admission, Simon seems reluctant to
endorse a categorically aggressive style of criminal defense. 9 His reluctance
springs from an abiding suspicion of the unruly tactics of delay and deception common to criminal defense advocacy. Concessions to state-focused
arguments of oppression and corruption, individual dignitary claims, and
equal protection demands fail to erase this suspicion. Skepticism persists
because criminal defense advocates too often engage strategies, manifested
here in the guise of lynching defenses, that neither vindicate intrinsic client
rights nor contribute to a substantive adjudication on the merits of client-state
claims. 96 For Simon, engagement in these practices, especially when tainted
by the gloss of racial hierarchy, weakens a lawyer's capacity to express
97
moral commitments in work.
A sixth objection emerges from Critical Race Theory. The postmodem
prong of Critical Race Theory embraces the socially constructed nature of
identity categories, alluding to the self and to community. To extract meaning
from contingent and sometimes indeterminate constructions, Critical Race theorists turn to social context, focusing on the divergent themes of cultural pluralism and the multiple but neglected histories of community struggle against racial injustice. Uncovering insurgent, participatory examples of community resistance divulges no clear bond between client and community. For decades,
political lawyers have tried to forge this bond.9 Their collective failure suggests that a transformative strategy of community-based legal and political advocacy may require alternative race-conscious practices fashioned from postmodem concepts of identity and community. These enigmatic conceptions offer no chance of quick resolution; they instead afford only high-risk experi92. See pp. 77-108.
93. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1729
(1993) (summarizing differences between defending against a civil plaintiff and defending against
the state).
94. See p. 170.
95. Seep. 173.
96. See pp. 170-94.
97. See pp. 170-94.
98. See generally Symposium, Political Lawyering: Conversations on Progressive Social
Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 (1996); Symposium, Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 983 (1994).
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mentation. Whether clients or communities stand willing to assume that risk in
the hurly-burly of advocacy remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

This essay began with the attempt to deploy Simon's adroit jurisprudential analysis of dominant ethics traditions against the field of criminal defense advocacy in order to understand better the meaning of racial identity,
racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in American law, lawyering, and ethics. Although Simon's descriptive analysis is often persuasive and
his prescriptive remedy is attractive, each is largely silent on the aspirational
tradition of racial justice in the legal profession. Indeed, what of racial dignity and community in client representation? Where is the evidence of moral
anxiety over racialized representation? Where is the jurisprudential foundation for racialized advocacy or adjudication when formalist, mechanical, and
categorical modes of reasoning fail? Simon displays no sure answer to these
overarching questions. However, he successfully outlines a framework from
which to critique and to rebuild a liberal vision of advocacy that may one day
end the subordinating discourse and imagery of race trials and thereby help rescue clients and communities of color from the harmful sociolegal experience of
subordination. If there is a race-conscious destiny for the ethics of American
lawyering traditions under the watch of liberal theory, it will begin in the pages
of Simon's critical devotion.

